STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE FILM
COVERT INTERVENTIONS
With a strong belief in the utility of clandestine operations, which would be reinforced by lucky successes in Iran and Guatemala that he personally managed, Allen Dulles oversaw the development and consolidation of the Central Intelligence Agency as a powerful and active arm of American foreign policy. Likewise, his belief in the importance of providing accurate intelligence led him to decisions that had their own foreign policy ramifications. However, the story of covert intervention and strategic intelligence is complicated by Dulles's use of information as a political tool and his deep-held ideology.
Left: Allen Dulles sits in front of a map. (Credit: CIA) |
Iran: Operation Ajax
After his appointment to head the Agency in 1953, Allen Dulles quickly became involved in Operation Ajax, the joint Anglo-American operation to oust Iran’s democratically elected and vigorously independent Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh. Allen met with his elder brother, John Foster, and CIA field operative Kermit Roosevelt, among others, with the express purpose to “get rid of” Mossadegh.[1] The younger Dulles quickly took personal interest in the operation, sending Roosevelt to manage the operation for him on the ground in Iran.[2] Allen even had a speech Eisenhower was to give on foreign policy altered to draw a harsher line on communism and reassure the Shah about the covert operation.[3] As the planning phase drew to a close, Dulles personally “[signed] off on the final details,”[4] and then travelled to Switzerland, where he was “to keep an eye on the situation in Iran from a closer vantage point.”[5] He eventually trekked to Rome to follow Operation Ajax’s progress more closely from the US embassy there.[6]
There appears to be little doubt that Allen Dulles was closely involved in managing Operation Ajax. But did Dulles’s direction, and the operation more broadly, contribute to the success of the coup in Iran? A British Foreign Office memo, of unknown provenance, dating to 2 September 1953, confirms that CIA interference was crucial. In particular, the document mentions that “the American Embassy had secretly handed over large sums of money to certain influential people,”[7] possibly a reference to the money that Allen Dulles had sent with Kermit Roosevelt.[8] A critical phase in the coup began with a “anti-Mussadiq and pro-Shah demonstration” by men who “had obviously been hired for the purpose,”[9] again suggesting successful action by Roosevelt. In its post-mortem of the successful coup, the document notes that “[t]here was general agreement that, were it not for American assistance and guidance… the plan for overthrowing MUSSADIQ’s government could not have succeeded.”[10] This British memo confirms that the US covert action, closely managed by Allen Dulles, was critical for increasing US influence in Iran and achieving containment.
There appears to be little doubt that Allen Dulles was closely involved in managing Operation Ajax. But did Dulles’s direction, and the operation more broadly, contribute to the success of the coup in Iran? A British Foreign Office memo, of unknown provenance, dating to 2 September 1953, confirms that CIA interference was crucial. In particular, the document mentions that “the American Embassy had secretly handed over large sums of money to certain influential people,”[7] possibly a reference to the money that Allen Dulles had sent with Kermit Roosevelt.[8] A critical phase in the coup began with a “anti-Mussadiq and pro-Shah demonstration” by men who “had obviously been hired for the purpose,”[9] again suggesting successful action by Roosevelt. In its post-mortem of the successful coup, the document notes that “[t]here was general agreement that, were it not for American assistance and guidance… the plan for overthrowing MUSSADIQ’s government could not have succeeded.”[10] This British memo confirms that the US covert action, closely managed by Allen Dulles, was critical for increasing US influence in Iran and achieving containment.
Guatemala: Operation PBSUCCESS
Allen Dulles’s personal management was also present in the CIA-sponsored coup in Guatemala. The government of Jacobo Arbenz had aroused concern in the Eisenhower administration for its extensive and radical reform policies, especially land redistribution, which threatened US commercial interests.[11] But it was Allen Dulles who, “[a]t the… NSC meeting of 18 February 1953… highlighted the Guatemalan situation as the most pressing threat to American interests in the region.”[12] Allen “was well aware” that his input, and the anti-Communist terms in which it was framed, “increased the likelihood of action being taken,”[13] a clear example of the younger Dulles influencing policy. On the heels of success in Iran, in September 1953 “Allen won NSC approval… to mount the necessary preparations” for the operation that would be known as PBSUCCESS and began personally influencing diplomatic postings to that effect.[14]
He also helped to assemble the team that was to manage the operation,[15] and met with them “at least three times weekly through the spring” of 1954.[16] As with his briefing to the NSC, he used his control of information to personally direct the Agency’s conclusion about the Czech arms shipments to Guatemala,[17] solidifying the administration’s opposition to the perceived Communism of Arbenz’s government. While the actual operation was underway, Allen – again acting in his capacity as an informer (and thereby indirect influencer of policy) – secured air support for PBSUCCESS by offering a theoretical figure of 20% as the operation’s chances of success with air cover.[18] President Eisenhower described this analysis as “persuasive” in convincing him to commit that support.[19]
He also helped to assemble the team that was to manage the operation,[15] and met with them “at least three times weekly through the spring” of 1954.[16] As with his briefing to the NSC, he used his control of information to personally direct the Agency’s conclusion about the Czech arms shipments to Guatemala,[17] solidifying the administration’s opposition to the perceived Communism of Arbenz’s government. While the actual operation was underway, Allen – again acting in his capacity as an informer (and thereby indirect influencer of policy) – secured air support for PBSUCCESS by offering a theoretical figure of 20% as the operation’s chances of success with air cover.[18] President Eisenhower described this analysis as “persuasive” in convincing him to commit that support.[19]
Intelligence vs. Idealism
Dulles's close involvement with these projects is better explained by his worldview than his commitment to accurate intelligence. In fact, around the time that the CIA grew interested in Guatemala, "card-carrying communists numbered about five thousand in a population of three million."[20] President Eisenhower was allegedly informed that the Central American republic had “a very small minority of communists... but not as many as San Francisco.”[21] This places Guatemala at the center of Dulles's complicated relationship with intelligence and idealism. While later examples will illustrate how far he was willing to go to gain accurate information, in Guatemala it seems that Dulles wielded intelligence to suit his political agenda. He was lucky that time. A similar mistake would be made in Cuba, where the CIA believed "without any evidence... that a landing of Cuban exiles would trigger an internal insurgency."[22] This debacle would spell the end of Dulles's career at the CIA.
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[1] Peter Grose, Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1994), 364. Scanned book. Accessed via HathiTrust Emergency Temporary Access Service.
[2] Ibid., 365.
[3] Ibid., 365.
[4] Ibid., 366.
[5] Hadley, The Rising Clamor, 48.
[6] Grose, Gentleman Spy, 367.
[7] British Foreign Office, "Persia: Political Review of the Recent Crisis" (memorandum, British Foreign Office, September 2, 1953), 2. From the George Washington University National Security Archive, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=4404301-Document-1-British-Foreign-Office-Persia.
[8] Grose, Gentleman Spy, 365.
[9] British Foreign Office, "Persia: Political Review of the Recent Crisis," 5.
[10] Ibid., 8.
[11] Hadley, The Rising Clamor, 50.
[12] Bevan Sewell, "The Pragmatic Face of the Covert Idealist: The Role of Allen Dulles in US Policy Discussions on Latin America, 1953–61," Intelligence and National Security 26, no. 2 (2011): 279.
[13] Sewell, "The Pragmatic Face of the Covert Idealist,” 279.
[14] Grose, Gentleman Spy, 374.
[15] Ibid., 374-5.
[16] Ibid., 377.
[17] Ibid., 379.
[18] Sewell, "The Pragmatic Face of the Covert Idealist,” 281-2.
[19] Ibid., 282.
[20] Gro, 369.
[21] Ibid.
[22] George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 706.
BERLIN TUNNEL
A checkpoint in Berlin during the Cold War. (Credit: Jan Saudek, via Wikimedia Commons)
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Dulles's drive for intelligence-gathering led him to embark on an ambitious scheme to tap Eastern Bloc telephone lines beneath occupied Berlin. A prior experiment in Vienna had established such techniques as valuable tool;[1] Dulles approved a similar project, the construction of a tunnel for wiretapping, in Berlin in 1954.[2] Over the course of a year, the tunnel was secretly dug beneath Berlin, and it became operational in 1955.[3] It would operate for nearly a year, collecting “443,000 fully transcribed conversations” among a wide set of other information, before the Soviets entered the tunnel from its other end in 1956.[4] While the Soviets were aware of the CIA operation through a British mole, they apparently made no effort to conceal the information from the taps, leading to a major success of intelligence gathering[5] - the intercepted data took nearly two and a half years to analyze and provided valuable insight into Soviet technology and military capacity.[6]
Dulles was immensely proud of the project as a CIA endeavor, and he later went on to flaunt the success in front of cameras in Berlin.[7] This personalized view of the intelligence project highlights the contrasts within Dulles approach to strategic intelligence. While the program was a major intelligence-gathering win for the CIA, Dulles seems to have taken substantial credit for a project that involved many other CIA officials and British support.[8] Additionally, interbranch competition in the intelligence services resulted in the NSA’s exclusion from the project.[9] While Dulles’s role in this particular relationship is unclear, it seems he did little to smooth things over or to encourage cooperation with the NSA.
[1] Peter Grose, Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1994), 396-7. Scanned book. Accessed via HathiTrust Emergency Temporary Access Service.
[2] The Berlin Tunnel, November 21, 2012 (accessed December 1, 2020).
[3] Grose, Gentleman Spy, 398.
[4] The Berlin Tunnel.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Grose, Gentleman Spy,398.
[7] Ibid., 399.
[8] Ibid., 395-8.
[9] National Security Agency Releases History of Cold War Intelligence Activities, 2017 (accessed December 1, 2020).
Dulles was immensely proud of the project as a CIA endeavor, and he later went on to flaunt the success in front of cameras in Berlin.[7] This personalized view of the intelligence project highlights the contrasts within Dulles approach to strategic intelligence. While the program was a major intelligence-gathering win for the CIA, Dulles seems to have taken substantial credit for a project that involved many other CIA officials and British support.[8] Additionally, interbranch competition in the intelligence services resulted in the NSA’s exclusion from the project.[9] While Dulles’s role in this particular relationship is unclear, it seems he did little to smooth things over or to encourage cooperation with the NSA.
[1] Peter Grose, Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1994), 396-7. Scanned book. Accessed via HathiTrust Emergency Temporary Access Service.
[2] The Berlin Tunnel, November 21, 2012 (accessed December 1, 2020).
[3] Grose, Gentleman Spy, 398.
[4] The Berlin Tunnel.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Grose, Gentleman Spy,398.
[7] Ibid., 399.
[8] Ibid., 395-8.
[9] National Security Agency Releases History of Cold War Intelligence Activities, 2017 (accessed December 1, 2020).
U2 PROGRAM
A U2 spy plane in trials. (Credit: Wikimedia Commons)
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Allen Dulles pushed heavily to fill the US information gap in the Soviet Union through the use of aerial reconnaissance, as detailed by a CIA memo from November 1954 that he sent to President Eisenhower on the subject.[1] Dulles clearly articulated that “there is not the prospect of gaining this vital intelligence without the conduct of systematic and repeated air reconnaissance over the Soviet Union.”[2] This document lead to the development of the U2 surveillance program,[3] which, while valuable, would cause numerous diplomatic incidents during its run. This recommendation sits well within the concerns of Dulles and other intelligence officials expressed in the early 1950s.
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Read the original memo here. File courtesy of the George Washington University National Security Archive, see note 1.
Dulles appears to have considered the possibility of air reconnaissance as early as 1953, when he reportedly met with General Samford of the US Air Force. Samford apparently described the intelligence-gathering situation as “’pushing on one end of a strand of limp spaghetti,’ and Mr. Dulles agreed to bring the matter of overflights up before the NSC.”[4] Fred Ayer, an Air Force intelligence assistant, took this exchange to Colonel Brad Smith in the Office of Special Operations of the Defense Department.[5] The memorandum that Col. Smith wrote summarized existing ideas on aerial intelligence, which suggested balloon overflight photography.[6] It appears that this program was ineffective: Dulles mentions in the opening of the 1954 memo that there were “large gaps” in “intelligence coverage of the Soviet Union” that hampered the administration’s understanding of Soviet capabilities.[7] In response to this demand, Dulles suggests – with a similar conclusion from other high-ranking military officials – high-altitude surveillance flights over the USSR.[8]
The value of the information these flights would provide to Dulles, and to the US government, is clear in a series of memorandums that Dulles published. Both DCI Directive 4/4 (December 1954)[9] and its successor, DCI Directive 4/5 (December 1955), assign the highest priority to intelligence on “Soviet over-all politico-military strategy, intention, and plans, particularly with respect to initiating hostilities using Soviet or Satellite armed forces” and to information on “[p]resent and probable future Soviet capabilities for nuclear attack.”[10] At a December 1955 meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, Dulles also indicated that “guided missiles intelligence was national intelligence of the highest priority,”[11] this bears obvious connections to the importance of Soviet capabilities information established in Directives 4/4 and 4/5.
While gathering this type of intelligence fits well within Allen’s vision in the memorandum and the goals of the U2 project, it also serves to illustrate Allen’s cross-department cooperative capabilities. His 1954 memorandum says that the project “would require the greatest possible collaboration between the Air Force and the Central Intelligence Agency.”[12] In the 1955 IAC meeting, Dulles emphasized that “[a] concerted attack on the problem by the [intelligence] community, under the guidance of an IAC guided missiles committee, is therefore essential” to national security.[13] This collaborative approach to strategic intelligence stands in sharp contrast to the Berlin affair, but can perhaps be explained by the CIA’s need to rely on the Air Force for aerial reconnaissance capabilities; such cooperation appears to have been unnecessary in the construction of the Berlin tunnel.
[1] Allen W. Dulles, “Memorandum for the President: Reconnaissance” (memorandum, Central Intelligence Agency, November 24, 1954). From the George Washington University National Security Archive, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=6763141-National-Security-Archive-Doc-07-Allen-W-Dulles.
[2] Ibid., 1.
[3] "Allen W. Dulles, Memorandum for the President, “Reconnaissance,” TOP SECRET, 24 November 1954." George Washington University National Security Archive, n.d. Accessed November 1, 2020. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=6763141-National-Security-Archive-Doc-07-Allen-W-Dulles. Specifically, the archive’s description of the document.
[4] Document 164, “Memorandum From Colonel Brad J. Smith in the Office of Special Operations of the Department of Defense to the Secretary of Defense’s Assistant for Special Operations (Erskine),” in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950-1955, The Intelligence Community, 1950–1955, eds. Edward C. Keefer, Douglas Keane, and Michael Warner (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007), 466-7.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Document 164, “Memorandum From Colonel Brad J. Smith,” 466-7.
[7] Dulles, “Memorandum for the President: Reconnaissance,” 1.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Document 201, “Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 4/4,” in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950-1955, The Intelligence Community, 1950–1955, eds. Edward C. Keefer, Douglas Keane, and Michael Warner (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007), 575-7.
[10] Document 238, “Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 4/5,” in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950-1955, The Intelligence Community, 1950–1955, eds. Edward C. Keefer, Douglas Keane, and Michael Warner (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007), 727-9.
[11] Document 245, “Minutes of a Meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Committee,” in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950-1955, The Intelligence Community, 1950–1955, eds. Edward C. Keefer, Douglas Keane, and Michael Warner (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007), 738-9.
[12] Dulles, “Memorandum for the President: Reconnaissance,” 3.
[13] Document 245, “Minutes of a Meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Committee,” 738-9.
The value of the information these flights would provide to Dulles, and to the US government, is clear in a series of memorandums that Dulles published. Both DCI Directive 4/4 (December 1954)[9] and its successor, DCI Directive 4/5 (December 1955), assign the highest priority to intelligence on “Soviet over-all politico-military strategy, intention, and plans, particularly with respect to initiating hostilities using Soviet or Satellite armed forces” and to information on “[p]resent and probable future Soviet capabilities for nuclear attack.”[10] At a December 1955 meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, Dulles also indicated that “guided missiles intelligence was national intelligence of the highest priority,”[11] this bears obvious connections to the importance of Soviet capabilities information established in Directives 4/4 and 4/5.
While gathering this type of intelligence fits well within Allen’s vision in the memorandum and the goals of the U2 project, it also serves to illustrate Allen’s cross-department cooperative capabilities. His 1954 memorandum says that the project “would require the greatest possible collaboration between the Air Force and the Central Intelligence Agency.”[12] In the 1955 IAC meeting, Dulles emphasized that “[a] concerted attack on the problem by the [intelligence] community, under the guidance of an IAC guided missiles committee, is therefore essential” to national security.[13] This collaborative approach to strategic intelligence stands in sharp contrast to the Berlin affair, but can perhaps be explained by the CIA’s need to rely on the Air Force for aerial reconnaissance capabilities; such cooperation appears to have been unnecessary in the construction of the Berlin tunnel.
[1] Allen W. Dulles, “Memorandum for the President: Reconnaissance” (memorandum, Central Intelligence Agency, November 24, 1954). From the George Washington University National Security Archive, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=6763141-National-Security-Archive-Doc-07-Allen-W-Dulles.
[2] Ibid., 1.
[3] "Allen W. Dulles, Memorandum for the President, “Reconnaissance,” TOP SECRET, 24 November 1954." George Washington University National Security Archive, n.d. Accessed November 1, 2020. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=6763141-National-Security-Archive-Doc-07-Allen-W-Dulles. Specifically, the archive’s description of the document.
[4] Document 164, “Memorandum From Colonel Brad J. Smith in the Office of Special Operations of the Department of Defense to the Secretary of Defense’s Assistant for Special Operations (Erskine),” in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950-1955, The Intelligence Community, 1950–1955, eds. Edward C. Keefer, Douglas Keane, and Michael Warner (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007), 466-7.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Document 164, “Memorandum From Colonel Brad J. Smith,” 466-7.
[7] Dulles, “Memorandum for the President: Reconnaissance,” 1.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Document 201, “Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 4/4,” in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950-1955, The Intelligence Community, 1950–1955, eds. Edward C. Keefer, Douglas Keane, and Michael Warner (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007), 575-7.
[10] Document 238, “Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 4/5,” in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950-1955, The Intelligence Community, 1950–1955, eds. Edward C. Keefer, Douglas Keane, and Michael Warner (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007), 727-9.
[11] Document 245, “Minutes of a Meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Committee,” in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950-1955, The Intelligence Community, 1950–1955, eds. Edward C. Keefer, Douglas Keane, and Michael Warner (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007), 738-9.
[12] Dulles, “Memorandum for the President: Reconnaissance,” 3.
[13] Document 245, “Minutes of a Meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Committee,” 738-9.