George C. Herring’s From Colony to Superpower introduces a wide variety of historical figures as it charts the history of US foreign policy, ranging from US Presidents and Secretaries of State to mid-level officials, ambassadors, and even little-known filibusters like Narciso López. Herring’s sweeping historical grand narrative has a tendency to focus on instances of American hubris; a perfect example of this related to Allen Dulles is Herring’s discussion of the failures of US interventions in the early Cold War. Yet his influence and impact often goes overlooked by Herring. When discussing Dulles’s most high-profile direct contributions to American foreign policy, covert action, particularly in Guatemala (1954) and Cuba (1961), Herring makes no mention of the younger Dulles’s impact;[1] as to Iran, where the US successfully staged a coup in 1953, his contribution is given only in the vaguest of terms.[2] Herring’s neglect of Dulles’s role in these policy failures is strange, given the variety of politicians he examines and his approach to the historiography of US foreign policy. Cover and book preview at right from Google Books. |
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I argue to the contrary that Allen Dulles made significant overt contributions to American foreign policy, and the impacts of some of his decisions, while not strictly intended as such, had major implications for US relations. His close ties to the foreign policy establishment, his own powerful position as an intelligence agent and later CIA director, and his extensive experience enabled him to make a policy impact that is still difficult to quantify, but which appears, in my examination, as both large and lasting. His tenure as CIA director left long-lasting traces on the Agency and US policy more broadly: he led the “CIA” in “establishing itself… as an instrument of power integral to the foreign policy of the United States,”[3] no small contribution. And the younger Dulles was seen as a vital contributor by President Eisenhower, who saw the CIA as an “extension of work of State Department [sic]”[4] and as “as an effective operational arm for an administration concerned as much with financial prudence as waging the Cold War.”[5] With his direct oversight of covert operations in Iran and Guatemala in mind, and with a broader policy and intelligence contribution to the Eisenhower presidency, I believe Dulles merits more mention than Herring provides in his brief overview of the time period.
Peter Grose’s expansive biography, Gentleman Spy, presents a more measured vision of Dulles’s time in the CIA: influential, but within his place. While Grose is clear on Dulles’s personal role in managing operations, he also makes clear that “at virtually every step along the way, Allen’s fledgling agency was responding to orders from the highest levels of government.”[6] He takes care, in cases such as the Berlin, to contextualize the role that Dulles played with information about his subordinates and partners in the CIA.[7] Meanwhile, others have looked at Dulles’s connections to the media[8] and to his idealism and role within the administration to better understand his historical impact.[9] Cover page at right downloaded from HathiTrust. |
From these examples, it would seem the method of evaluation shapes a scholar’s understanding of the historical impact a figure has. Sewell is able to make a strong argument for Dulles’s importance by focusing on the combination of his practical side, honed by decades of intelligence work, and his idealism, developed through careful thought on the international system starting before the Second World War. This is what makes Herring’s treatment of Dulles stand out – surely a historical overview that calls on key figures in US foreign relations, with a critical bend on US hubris, would discuss a controversial and impactful figure at the heart of the early CIA? Perhaps it is the latter half of this approach that drives Herring’s decision: Herring is careful to attribute the interventionist policies to Eisenhower and his administration, not any one figure.[10] This view seems consistent with Grose’s and is an appropriately cautious approach, especially given the complex and often opaque dynamics between Dulles and his colleagues in the administration discussed elsewhere in this project.
Nevertheless, as this website illustrates, Allen Dulles was involved in a number of important – and daring – projects throughout his long career in US intelligence. With substantial work left to be done in understanding Dulles’s relationship with his brother and how that relationship impacted foreign policy, the history of his role in the early Cold War is not yet definitively written. Future scholars should keep in mind the importance of organizational leadership and avoid glossing over the details if not absolutely necessary. Allen Dulles represents both a compelling case for this careful approach to history, and an exciting and engaging example to draw on.
[1] George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). Guatemala is discussed on 684-5, and the Bay of Pigs invasion on 705-707.
[2] Ibid., 672.
[3] Peter Grose, Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1994), 385. Scanned book. Accessed via HathiTrust Emergency Temporary Access Service.
[4] Ibid., 385.
[5] Sewell, "The Pragmatic Face of the Covert Idealist,” 274.
[6] Grose, Gentleman Spy, 385.
[7] Ibid., 398.
[8] David P. Hadley, The Rising Clamor: The American Press, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Cold War(Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2019), 44. Ebook. Accessed via ProQuest Ebook Central.
[9] Bevan Sewell, "The Pragmatic Face of the Covert Idealist: The Role of Allen Dulles in US Policy Discussions on Latin America, 1953–61," Intelligence and National Security 26, no. 2 (2011): 279.
[10] Herring, From Colony to Superpower, 672, 683-5.
Nevertheless, as this website illustrates, Allen Dulles was involved in a number of important – and daring – projects throughout his long career in US intelligence. With substantial work left to be done in understanding Dulles’s relationship with his brother and how that relationship impacted foreign policy, the history of his role in the early Cold War is not yet definitively written. Future scholars should keep in mind the importance of organizational leadership and avoid glossing over the details if not absolutely necessary. Allen Dulles represents both a compelling case for this careful approach to history, and an exciting and engaging example to draw on.
[1] George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). Guatemala is discussed on 684-5, and the Bay of Pigs invasion on 705-707.
[2] Ibid., 672.
[3] Peter Grose, Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1994), 385. Scanned book. Accessed via HathiTrust Emergency Temporary Access Service.
[4] Ibid., 385.
[5] Sewell, "The Pragmatic Face of the Covert Idealist,” 274.
[6] Grose, Gentleman Spy, 385.
[7] Ibid., 398.
[8] David P. Hadley, The Rising Clamor: The American Press, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Cold War(Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2019), 44. Ebook. Accessed via ProQuest Ebook Central.
[9] Bevan Sewell, "The Pragmatic Face of the Covert Idealist: The Role of Allen Dulles in US Policy Discussions on Latin America, 1953–61," Intelligence and National Security 26, no. 2 (2011): 279.
[10] Herring, From Colony to Superpower, 672, 683-5.